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Discontinuous Distributions and Missing Persons:
The Minimum Wage and Unemployed Youth
ABSTRACT
The effects of minimum wage legislation on the employment and wage rates
of youth are estimated using a new statistical approach. We find that with-
out the minimum, not only would the percent of out-of-school youth who are
employed be 4 to 6 percent higher than it is, but also that these youth would
earn more.In particular, the expected hourly earnings of youth with market
wage rates below the 1978 minimum are 10 percent lower with the minimum than
they would be without it. Thus, an effect of the minimum is to increase the
concentration of non-employment among low-wage workers and to reduce their
earnings relative to higher wage workers as well. The minimum wage accounts
for possibly a third of the difference between the employment rates of black
and white youth, according to our results.
Our methodology is based on parameterization of the effect of the minimum
on the distribution of "market" employment outcomes and market wage rates that
would exist in the absence of the minimum. A concomitant of the estimation
procedure is joint estimation of market wage and employment functions that
would pertain if there were no minimum.
Professor David A. Wise






2100 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 223—1950 x427DISCONTINUOUS DISTRIBUTIONS AND MISSING PERSONS:
THE MINIMUM WAGE AND UNEMPLOYED YOUTH
by
Robert H. Meyer and David A. Wise*
Most econometric analysis rests on the assumption that random
variables have continuous distributions. But government programs and
legislation often impose constraints on individual choice so that empiri-
cally observed distributions are discontinuous. The minimum wage has
such an effect on the distribution of observed wage rates. Most arialyss
of the effect of the minimum, however, is based on inferences from aggre-
gate data and disregards these effects. Our analysis not only accounts
explicitly for the effects of the minimum on observed distributions of
employment and wage rates, but makes these effects an integral part of
the process by which the employment and wage impacts of the minimum are
estimated.
We have proposed a procedure that estimates the employment and wage
effects of the minimum by explicitly parameterizing the relationship be-
tween the level of the minimum wage relative to the "market" wage rates
that individuals would receive in the absence of the minimum. Indeed our
approach parameterizes both observed wage and observed employment outcomes
in terms of underlying "market" wage and "market" employment relationships.
*Robert Meyer is a Ph.D. candidate and David Wise is a Professor of
Political Economy, J.F.K. School of Government, Harvard University.-2-
The procedure thus estimates market wage and employment functions for
youth, neither of which may be estimated directly from observed data be-
cause whether particular data are observed empirically is determined in
part by the minimum itself. Parameter estimates are obtained by maximum
likelihood.
A concomitant of our procedure is estimation of a market wage func-
tion that allows us to compare average market wage rates with the wage
rates of persons employed in the presence of a minimum wage, and to com-
pare market wage rates with the expected wage in the presence of the mini-
mum of all youth who would have been employed in its absence. The trun-
cation and concentration effects of the minimum on the observed distri-
bution of wages are explicitly incorporated in our statistical model.In
addition, we are able because of the estimation of market wage and
employment functions, to compare the distribution of employment versus
non-employment by market wage rate when there is no minimum with the
distribution when a minimum exists.
To evaluate the results of the minimum wage it is necessary to take
account of its effect on employment and its effect on wage rates. Our
procedureprovides estimates of both of these effects as a direct product
of ourestimationprocedure.
Theeffect of the minimum is commonly presumed to be greater the high-
er it is relative to the distribution of wages that would be paid in
absence of a minimum. Indeed most time series and cross-section analysis
of the effects of the minimum are based on relationships between employ-
ment and the ratio of the mtnimum wage to an average or median wage, often—3-
an average adult wage but sometimes the average wage paid to employed
youth. Previous studies have been based on aggregate time series data
(e.g., Gramlich [1976], Mincer [1976], and Hamermesh [1980]) or aggregate
cross-section data (e.g., Welch and Cunningham [1978], Ehrenberg and
Marcus [1979], and Cunningham [1980]).
Our analysis differs from these approaches in at least two respects.
First, itis based on individual wage and employment data--collected in
the May 1978 Current Population Survey. Second, the estimation technique
emphasizes explicitly the relationship between the level of the minimum
wage relative to the distribution of market" wage rates that individuals
would receive in the absence of a minimum. Some persons who in the absence
of the minimum would be paid a wage below it are presumed to receive the
legal minimum, while others are presumed to go without work. Still others
because of non-coverage or non-compliance may continue to be paid below the
minimum. Our goal is to estimate the effect of the minimum wage by ex-
plicitly paranieterizing and estimating the likelihood that each of these
outcomes occurs.
We find that persons who have market wage rates below the minimum,
in the presence of the minimum, are paid the minimum with probability
approximately .5 and lose their jobs with probability .25. Simulations
based on our estimates indicate that employment of out-of-school young
men would be 4 to 6 percent higher if the minimum were eliminated. On
average, the expected wage of youth is lower with the minimum than with-
out it. In particular, the expected wage of youth whose market wage rates
are below the minimum is approximately 10 percent lower with than without
the minimum. In addition, the concentration of non-employment among low--4-
wage workers is much more pronounced with theminimum than without it.
More succinctly, those who are paid the least without the minimum, are
hurt the most by it.
Our model allows estimation of the primary effects of the minimum
wage as described by most researchers. In particular, wehave presumed
that the effect is concentrated on persons who would otherwise be paid
below the minimum. The model as set forth in this paper does not allow,
for example, for an upward shift in the whole wage distributionbecause
of the minimum. Although we do not believe this to be a first-order
effect of the minimum, it is likely to occur to some extent. Underrather
plausible assumptions, however, our primary resultswould not be affected
by such shifts. Nonetheless, we will in future researchaddress this
possibility directly.
Graphs of wage distributions that serve to motivate our analysisare
presented in section I. Our procedure rests on jointestimation of mar-
ket wage and employment equations. If the disturbance termsin these
two equations are uncorrelated, however, the basic parametersof the model
may be estimated from a likelihoodfunction based on the conditional dis-
tribution of observed wage rates only.1 For expository purposes, weshall
first present in section II this simple model and parameterestimates based
on it, without explicitly deriving it as a special caseof the two-equa-
tion model. This allows the reader to understand the approachin a
relatively uncomplicated context that is directly motivated bythe graphs
1. As itturns out, this single-equation conditional wage distribution
modelis similar to the specification used by Hausman and Wise [1981] to
correct for endogenous sampling with a continuous outcome variable.—5—
in Section I.
Then the more complete model based on joint estimation of a market
wage function together with a market employment function is presented in
section III, together with empirical results based on it. This estimation
procedure uses all available information on employment status and wage
rates and is not restricted to observations with observed wage rates,
unlike the simple model. And in this section, the single equation model
is derived as a special case of the more general model. For expository
purposes, some of the shortcomings of the simple model are explained for
the first time in this section. Indeed for this reason some readers
may wish to read the first part of this section before section II. The
basic results of the empirical analysis are presented in section IV in the
form of simulations. Concluding remarks and discussions are included in
section V.—6-
I.Empirical Wage Distributions
To motivate our analysis, we have graphed the empirically observed
wage distributions for selected groups of youth.
The graphs are in the form of histograms with breaks at 25 cent inter-
vals. For convenience, one break is at the 1978 minimum wage of $2.65.
For most groups, there is a substantial discontinuity in the distribution
at this point and it can be easily identified. To facilitate comparison
among groups, the histogram includes in the wage interval .9O to 1.15all
persons with wage rates below 1.15 and in the interval 5.90 to 6.15 all
persons with wage rates above 5.90. Thus apparent concentrationin these
intervals must be interpreted accordingly. If the entire distribution
were graphed, the graph would approach zero gradually at both tails.
One of the presumptions underlying our analytic approach is that
the minimum wage should have a greater impact in low-wage than in high—
wage areas. This idea seems intuitively confirmed by comparisonof Figures
1 and 2 in the text. The first shows the distribution for non-students 16
to 24 in the states with the lowest quintile of average adult wage rates;
the second shows the distribution in states where the average adult wage
rate is in the highest quintile. The distributions in both areas show a
substantial discontinuity at the minimum, but it is clear that the impact
of the minimum on the observed distribution of wage rates is much greater
in the low wage areas.
We also presume that the minimum wage should impinge more on youth
whose personal attributes are associated with lower earnings than on
youth whose personal attributes are associated with higher earnings. For—7-
example, older youth with more schooling we assume would be most likely to
have wage rates (possibly marginal products) above the minimum wage and
thus not be affected substantially by it. This proposition is consistent
with the distribution presented in Figure 3.Figure 3 shows the wage
distribution for non-student youth 20 to 24 in high—wage areas with 14
years or more schooling. The effect of the minimum is barely apparent
in this distribution.
Comparison of the distributions in Figures 4 and 5 for youth 16 to
17 versus 20 to 24 respectively provides further evidence that is also
consistent with plausible intuition. Our intuition suggests that persons
with attributes associated with low wages should be most affected by the
minimum. The graphs strongly support this expectation.
Although these distributions help to motivate our subsequent analysis
and in general are consistent with intuition, it is not clear from the
graphs what the employment effect of the minimum is.It seems clear that
one result is a concentration of wage rates at the minimum, but whether
the apparent increase to the minimum of the wage rates of some youth is
offset by non-employment of others cannot be inferred from the graphs;
thus the motivation for our estimation technique.
There is also another consideration that may be obscured in the graphs,
but to which our analysis is directed. For example, the distributions
for whites 16 to 24 and for blacks 16 to 24 (neither of which is shown)
appear quite similar. But the distributions pertain to employed youthin
both groups. Differences between the attributes of employed black and






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 the two groups. Many fewer black than white youth are employed. Whether
the distributions of wage rates without the minimum would look like those
with the minimum cannot be inferred from the graphs, although our methodology
allows us to predict such differences.-14 -
II.A Simple Approach
Although we shall ultimately obtain estimates based on the joint
distribution of observed wage rates and employment status of youth, for
expository purposes we shall begin with a model that is based on observed
wage rates only. This allows a development that may be intuitively
motivated by the empirical wage distributions shown in section I. And it
allows us to set forth in a simple context the rationale behind our
approach. Then we shall detail a model that treats employment and wage
outcomes jointly, a special case of which is the model set forth here.
A. The Model
Consider a group of youth characterized by a vector of measured
attributes X. The elements of X include individual measures such as
education and age, and also area specific indicators of labor market
conditions. Suppose that in the absence of a minimum wage, the distri-
bution in the population of wages paid to employed persons with attributes
X would be described by the density function f(X); we shall refer to it as
the 'underlying" or market distribution of wages. Graphically, think of








Now suppose that the minimum wage is set at level M. Some persons
will continue to be paid a wage below the minimum because they work in
non-covered sectors of the economy or on jobs that are not subject to
the minimum. And indeed there may be some shifting of employment from
covered to non-covered sectors and jobs. Others may be paid below the
minimum because of non-compliance. For whatever reason, the net result
is that some persons with an underlying wage below the minimum will
continue to be hired at a wage below M. To allow for this possibility,
we suppose that there is a probability P1 that persons with an under-
lying wage below M will receive a wage below this level. (We have not
allowed P1 to depend on the precise value of the underlying wage.)
We also suppose that some persons with an underlying wage below the
minimum would after its introduction be paid at the minimum.' Although
a simple application of marginal productivity theory would imply that
persons with an underlying wage below M, would not receive M, there are
several possible explanations for such a possibility. One is that employers
may pay the minimum to persons they would otherwise pay less than the mini-
mum, but hire fewer or hire them for fewer hours. Whereas without the
minimum, a young person may be hired on a permanent basis for eight hours
each Saturday, if the youth must be paid the minimum, he may be hired for
fewer hours to do only those tasks at which he is most productive. Employers
may, for example be less prepared to pay for "slacktime."2
1. Welch and Cunningham (1978) impose an extreme form of this
assumption, that is, that all persons with market wage rates below
the minimum are paid the minimum when it is in effect.
2. Hall (1979) develops this point within a framework based
on the theory of employment contracts.—16—
Another possibility is that since the minimum wage applies only to
compensation paid directly to an employee, employers can vary the level of
non-wage compensation (e.g., on-the-job training or fringe benefits) to
offset changes in direct compensation. Individuals with market wages below
the minimum may be raised to the minimum in exchange for a comparable
reduction in on-the-job training expenditures and fringe benefits. Individ-
uals with market wages above the minimum will be unaffected.1
Another explanation is that employers hire at the minimum persons
who would otherwise be hired at wage rates below the minimum, but offset
this overpayment with slower wage increases--say, with age for example--
than would be observed without the minimum.2
In addition, employers may find it difficult to identify differences
in the quality of young workers, particularly in view of the high turnover
in youth employment and the absence of an extensive employment history.
If only because of this lack of precision, employers to comply with the
legislation may raise to the minimum the wage rates of some employees who
would otherwise receive an underlying wage below M. Whatever the reason
we suppose that with probability P2, a person with an underlying wage
below the minimum will be employed and paid the minimum.
Those with an underlying market wage below the minimum who are not
hired at a wage below M or who are not hired at M are assumed to be without
work after the introduction of the minimum. The probability that these
1. See Mincer and Leighton [1980] for an analysis of the effects
of the minimum wage on investment in on-the-job training. Wessels [1980]
examines the theoretical aspect of the minimum wage in a model that
includes fringe benefits.
2. Lazear [1980] has investigated this possibility, but did not
find much empirical support for it.—17-
persons would be without work because of the minimum is 1 —P1
-
P2.
We assume that the minimum wage does not affect the wages received by
youth whose underlying wage is above the minimum. Although it is some-
times argued that the minimum wage tends to shift upward the whole
distribution of wage rates, we believe that our model captures the primary
postulated effects of the minimum.1
These ideas can be described more formally as follows. Suppose that
the expected underlying wage of individuals with measured personal and
regional attributes X is given by X and that the variance of wage rates
among persons with characteristics X isa2. This gives rise to a wage
distribution f(W) like that shown in Figure 6. That is,
(1) W =X+
wherec is a disturbance term with variancea2
With a minimum wage M, wage rates may be distributed as represented
graphically by the dotted function in Figure 6. The form of this
function depends on the values of P1 and P2. For example, if P2 were
zero, there would be no pile-up of wages at M, only a jumpin the density
function at M. If both P1 and P2 were zero, the density function would
be truncated at M.
1.In addition, we have not allowed P1 or P2 to depend--for persons
with market wage rates below M--on the difference between the market wage
and the minimum, although in principle we think that they would. We
believe, however, that our estimates of P1 and P2 are good estimates of
the average values that would be obtained if som@what more realistic
assumptions were incorporated in our statistical analysis. Indeed, this
conclusion is supported by estimates obtained by dividing the market
distribution below the minimum into two intervals and estimating P1 and
values for each interval.-18-













This formulation--although we shall
show below its derivation from a model treating wage rates and employment
jointly--may be arrived at by assuming that a random sample is drawn from
the underlying distribution of market wage rates. Then, of the values
below M, some are set to M (with probability P2), while others are discarded
(with probability (1 —P1
-
P2)).
Then h(w) is the distribution of ob-
served wage rates in terms of the underlying distribution f. The denomin-
ator D may be thought of as a normalizing factor assuring that the density
function integrates to 1. One can also think of h(w) as the conditional
distribution of wages, given that a wage is observed.1 The other elements
of the function may be explained in the following way. A value of W <M
will be observed with likelihood P1 times the likelihood of an underlying
wage W =w.The likelihood of an observed wage at the minimum (1 cent
1.It is the probability that an individual who would have an ob-
served wage rate in the absence of the minimum will also have one after
the introduction of the minimum. Or it is the probability that a person
who is employed without the minimum will also be employed with, the minimum.-19-
interval) is equal to the likelihood of an underlying wage at the minimum,
plus the probability that the underlying wage is below the minimum but is
raised to the minimum. Observed wage rates above the minimum follow the
distribution of the underlying wage, except that a larger proportion of
observed than of underlying wages may be above the minimum, as indicated
by the denominator D.
For convenience, we shall consider the minimum wage to be an inter-
val (it may be arbitrarily small, say 1 cent), going fromM1 to M2. We
shall also assume that W, or a transformation of W(e.g., in W) is dis-
tributed normally. Then ifis taken to be a standardized normal distri-











Pa).We have used this
specification because it allows us conveniently to test the sensitivity





minimum with those at the minimum.1
Suppose that among N persons with observed wage rates, N1 are below
M, N2 are "at M and, N3 are above M. For these N persons indexed by
i, the log-likelihood of the realized observations would be
N1 N2 N3
(4) L = in h(w.) + in h(w) + in h(w1),
1=1 i=l i=l
with the specification of h(w) for each group taken from equation (3).
This function is maximized with respect to ,a,P1 and P2.
1.Following standard practice, the log of wages is used as the
dependent variable in our wage model. Since our results are likely to
be sensitive to this distributional assumption, we have also experimented




log wif X =U
We find that the predicted nonemployment resulting from the minimum
wage is least when wages are assumed to be log normal (i.e.,X0)
and greatest when nominal wages are assumed to be normally distributed
(i.e., x =1).Estimates of the empirical distribution of wage rates
compared with the predicted distribution based on the log normal
density are presented below.—21-
B.Parameter Estimates Based on the Simple Model
The variables used in the estimation are defined as follows:
Age: Age in years.
School: Number of years of school completed.
Race: Equal to 1 for blacks and zero otherwise.
Sex: Equal to 1 for women and zero for men.
Union: Equal to 1 for union members and zero otherwise.
Part-time: Equal to 1 for persons working part-time and zero
otherwise.
City: Equal to 1 if the person lives in an urban area and zero
otherwise.
Never Married: Equal to 1 if the person has never married and
zero if married, widowed, or divorced.
Area Wage: The average wage of adult manufacturing workers in
the SMSA or state in which the person lives.
Area Unemployment: The adult unemployment rate in the SMSA or
state in which the person lives.
Northeast: Equal to 1 if the person lives in the Northeast
and zero otherwise.
South: Equal to 1 if the person lives in the South and zero
otherwise.
West: Equal to 1 if the person lives in the West and zero
otherwise.
Wage: The dependent variable. The logarithm of the hourly
wage rate, except where noted.—22-
1. Comparison with Least Squares Results
Estimates of the parameters in equation (3) for a sampleof all out-
of-school young men and women aged 16 to 24 are shown inTable 1. To serve
as an informal check for general consistencyof our results with the assump-
tions motivating our model, we have also compared our wagefunction parameter
estimates with least squares estimates. We shall not emphasizethe empirical
significance of the estimates in this section; they aretreated as illustra-
tive. Following the discussion of these results, wewill compare estimates
based on our model for selected subgroups of youth.Simulated effects of
the minimum on the employment of these subgroups are presentedin section IV.
Recall that a concomitant of our procedure is to estimatethe "market"
wage of an individual given hisattributes. We suppose that the youth whose
wage rates we measure are only a portionof those who would have measured
wage rates in the absence of theminimum. In particular, some persons who
would otherwise be employed and thus have an observedmarket wage below the
minimum do not have an observed wage rate. We proceeded asthough our
sample were drawn from a group that, in theabsence of the minimum, would
have measured wages, but if an individual had amarket wage less than M,
the observation was retained, assigned the value M, orthrown out with
probabilities P1, P2, and 1 -P1
-
P2respectively.1
Consider first the wage function parameter estimates,the s's. To
motivate the relationship between our estimatesand the least squares re-
sults, we have graphed in Figure 7 the hypothesizedmarket relationship
1. We did not constrain by functional form P1 +P2
to be less than 1.between average area wage rates and youth wages.
With the establishment of the minimum wage at M, some persons who
would be employed and have observed market wage rates below M are not
employed and thus not in the sample, while others have wage rates equal
to M; some remain employed with wage rates below M. Thus as shown by the
dashed line in Figure 7, if the minimum had the hypothesized effect on
employment, least squares estimates would underestimate the relationship
between average area wage rates and the underlying market wage.'
We see from Table 1, that this is indeed the case. Our estimates
of the coefficient on area wage is 22 percent higher than the least squares
estimate. Similar expectations and estimated results apply to other variables.
1. This truncated distribution result is similar to the case dis-
cussed by Hausman and Wise [1977], in which the truncation was complete and










For example, our schooling coefficient is 28 percenthigerthan the least
squares estimate; our coefficient on age is 28 percent higher.Apparent-
ly persons from low wage areas and with personal attributes that are assoc-
iated with lower market wages tend either to be excluded from the sample or
to have wage distributions with concentrations at theminimum.'
And our estimatedvalues of P1 and P2 are consistent with the relation-
ship between our estimated slope parameters and least squaresestimates.
Our estimated value of P1 (.231) indicates the 23 percent of persons with
market wages below the minimum continue to be employed at wages below M,
while the estimate of P2 (.338) indicates that 34 percent of this group re-




who have market wages below the minimum and would otherwise be employed are
not employed, according to these estimates.
We wouldalso expect--based onFigure 7 for example-- that given
characteristicsX,the variance of observed wage rates would be lower than
the variance of market wage rates, and our estimates are consistentwith
this intuition. Our estimate of the standard error of wage rates (a)is
.335 while the least squares estimate is .296.
Because our methodology emphasizes the interaction between an individ-
ual's market wage and the impact of the minimum--in particular that the effect
will be greater on workers with lower market wages--we also emphasize the
substantial estimated effects of race and sex on market wage rates. Hold-
ing the other variables constant, women earn 22 percent less than menand
1.Estimates for subgroups (not shown) are also consistent withthis
expectation. For youth 16 to 17, who have relatively lowmarket wages, our
estimated area wage coefficient of .065 is 1.6 times as large asthe least
squares estimate of .040. For women 16 to24 our estimate is 2.7 times as
large as the least squares estimate (.049 versus .018respectively).-25-.
Table 1.Parameter Estimates for Out


























































































blacks 7 percent less than whites. These estimates suggest that we should
predict a greater impact of the minimum on women and blacks than onwhite men.
Union members in this age group according to our estimates have a
"market' wage 37 percent higher than non—union youth, holding other attri-
butes constant. The wage rates of most union members are well abovethe
minimum. Youth working part-time earn 19 percent less than those working
full-time.
In the subsequent analysis we have eliminated the union and part-time
variables because they are essentially endogenous. Both union and member-
ship and part-time work are likely to depend in part oneducation and age,
for example, and part-time at least may indeed be affected by theminimum
wage. These variables also are available onlyfor persons who are employ-
ed and would thus have to be inferred in the two-equation modeldescribed
below. To limit the number of variables in the model, we also haveelimin-
ated the three regional dummies. In general, we found that regionaleffects--
other than for the West--were not significantly different from zeroafter
inclusion of the area wage and unemployment variables.
2. Estimates for Selected Groups of Men
Parameter estimates for selected groups of out-of-school male youth
are shown in Table 2. The estimates for each group arebased on all the
observations in the survey that are in that group. Of most interest are
the values for P1 and P2. For all male youth between 16 and 24,the
estimates indicate that approximately 32 percent of persons whowould have
jobs with market wages below the minimum are excludedfrom employment by
the minimum. Black youth are somewhat more likely than whitesto be-27-
Table 2. Parameter Estimates for Selected Groups


































































































































excluded--38percent versus 29percent.1 According to these estimates,
differential effects of the minimum on these groups ariseboth from
differences among the groups in market wage rates, dependent onthe
personal characteristics X, and differencesin the probability of being
hired given a market wage rate below the minimum.
The estimates for 16 to 24 year old black and white youthtogether
imply that on average blacks earn 11 percentless than whites with the
same measured characteristics (the coefficient onthe black variable is
-.107), For the younger group, however, theestimated black versus white
effectis zero.
The estimates of P1 and P2 also differ by age group. Teenagers
market wages below the minimum are more likely than youth20 to 24 to
hired at these wage rates. Differences in the jobsheld by the two
groups relative to the minimum wagelegislation coverage we believe to
be a likely explanation for this finding. We cannotrule out differences
in compliance rates, however.
On the other hand, teenagers who would otherwisebe hired at market
rates less than the minimum are slightly more likelythan 20 to 24 year
olds to be hired at the minimum. One explanationis that according to
our estimates the variance of underlyingmarket rates is smaller for
teenagers than for older young persons.Thus among out-of-school teen-
agers, market rates below theminimum are bunched closer to the minimum
1.It is possible that the black youth are lesslikely than whites
to be hired at the minimum--if theirmarket wage rates are below the
minimum--because the expected value of market wagerates below the
minimum is lower for blacks than for whites,and for this reason their
wage rates less likely tobe raised to the minimum.
with
be-29-
than are the sub-minimum market rates of older youth. It also seems
probable to us that given measured characteristics X, sub-minimum market
wage rates are more likely among older workers than among teenagers to
be associated with poor employee attributes. If this were true, pre-
sumably employers would be less willing to "take a chance" with older work-
ers and hire them at the minimum.
In sum, these estimates indicate that approximately 32 percent of men
16 to 24 with market wage rates below the minimum are without work because
of it. Contrary to our expectation at least, our estimates imply that
less than 20 percent of 16 to 17 year olds with market wage rates below the
minimum are displaced by it.
3. An Empirical versus a Predicted Distribution
Unlike most more traditional methods of analysis, the distributional
assumptions play a key role in our work. It has become standard practice
to assume that wage functions are log-normal, and the results reported
above are based on a log-normal distribution as well. However, to check
the sensitivity of our results to this assumption and to determine a "best"
fit, we also experimented with other distributions, using a Box-Cox trans-
formation of wage rates.1
A comparison of the empirical distribution of wage rates by interval for
all male youth 16 to 24 versus the predicted distribution based on the log-
normal wage distribution is shown in Figure 8.It appears from the graph
that the fit is quite close, especially at the tails where alternative
1. See footnote 1, page 15.-30-
distributions are likely to give different results. Thus if we can fit
the tails in particular, we have added confidence in our results. The
actual percentages below the minimum, at the minimum (interval), and
above $5.90 are 4.9, 15.6, and 21.1 respectively; the predicted percent-
ages are 5.0, 16.1, and 18.8. No continuous distribution, of course, can
capture precisely the pile-up of wage rates at "magnet" values like $3.00,
$4.00, or $5.00.
A somewhat some formal way to measure the fit is to calculate a chi-
square statistic based on the differences between the empirical and predicted





(where n is the number of observations in the th interval, and J is the
number of intervals) has a chi-square distribution with N-(J -1+K)degrees
of freedom, where K is the number of parameters estimated in our model.
Among a wide range of distributions that we tried, the log-normal gives
the smallest chi—square value. It is very much smaller than the chi-square
















































































































































III. A More Complete Model: Employment and Wages
The results of the simple model are based only on the distribution
of wage rates among youth who reported an hourly wage rate (plus a small
number of youth for whom we could calculate a wage from reported weekly
earnings and hours). Among the 24,305 youth 16 to 24 included in the
May 1978 Current Population Survey, the distribution by employment and






Salary Not Reported 42.4
Employed-Hourly 39.1 100.0
Wage Reported 90.7
Wage Not Reported 9.3
The estimates in Section II were based on the distribution of wages among
sub—groups of out-of-school youth with reported waç'erates.'
The data, however, contain much more information than wage rates. In
particular, they contain information on employment status. Although it is
plausible under our assumptions to base estimates only on the wage data and
from them to infer employment effects, it is clear that more robust estimates
could be obtained by combining the wage data with the information on employ-
ment status. Intuitively, it appears that the addition of employment data
1.To obtain adequate sample sizes we used all youth in some categories.-33-
should make the estimates less dependent on distributional assumtions.
In using both employment and wage data, we must also account for those
youth who are employed, but for whom we do not have a reported wage.
We will show that the single equation model is a special case of
this more general model and is a correct model if the disturbance terms
in the wage and employment equations are uncorrelated. But in this model,
a zero correlation does not mean that employment and wage equations can
be estimated separately with no loss of information. Indeed a market
employment equation cannot be estimated without considering a wage function
as well. And estimating the two equations jointly provides additional
information on wage rates, even with a zero correlation. As usual, the
use of more information constrains the parameter estimates to reflect more
empirical fact and to this extent provides better estimates, but in this
case the information does not "separate" as might be expected on the basis
of experience with more standard models.
A. A Two-Equation Model
In addition to an underlying wage distribution that would exist in
the absence of the minimum wage, we shall incorporate explicitly an
lying employment relationship. Again, it is useful to think of a group of
individuals with measured attributes X. Suppose that in the absence of a
minimum wage, the employment and wage relationships would be of the form
E =Xc +
(5) w=x+
Rprobability of a reported
hourly wage.-34-
with E an unobserved index variable with the propertythat an individual





GivenX, R is assumed to be uncorrelated with E and W,although R could
in principle depend on X and need not be the same foreach person with
observed attributes X.
For expository purposes we shall pause for amoment and consider a
diagram that relates the values of E, W,and R to the possible outcomes
in the presence of a minimum wage, as shownin Figure 9. The entries with-
in the diagram pertain to outcomes with aminimum wage. The notation on
the top and bottom outside margins of the diagrampertain to underlying
values of the employment and wage variables.On the right outside margin
is indicated whether, among persons who wouldbe employed in the absence
of a minimum, a wage would be reported. Thelined area indicates the pro-
portion of the group who would not be employedwith a minimum wage. Those
with E <0would not be employed without the minimum andadded to this
group are those with W <Mwho are not employed with a minimum--the two
areas indicated by 1 -P1
-
P2.
Some of the latter group would have a re-
ported wage and others would not. Weobserve hourly wage rates for persons
schematically included in the shaded area.(This was the group used in
the procedure described in Section II. Fromthis group we estimated P1
and P2.) The remaining group we observe to be employedbut we don't ob-





Employed age w >M
Reported
To do this we assume that E and W (a transformation of the wage rate)
are distributed bivariate normal. To facilitate computation--and we be-
lieve without appreciably altering the results--we suppose, as noted above,
that the unmeasured determinants of the underlying employment and wage
equations on the one hand and the unmeasured determinants of whether a
wage is reported on the other, are not correlated. This allows us to pro-
ceed with a bivariate instead of a trivariate distribution) For the ease
of exposition we have only specified two relationships in equation (5). We
1. We shall not explain this in detail but without this assumption,
the development would proceed much as we have laid it out except that we


















E< 0 E> 0
Fioure 9might more formally have added a third, say S =XS+ wherean employed
worker has an observed wage if S >0.If is uncorrelated with and
s2, however, expressions like Pr(E >0,Ww, S >0)can be written as
Pr(E >0,W =w)Pr(S>0).Our assumptions lead to expressions like these
and rather than carry the third equation throughout the analysis, we have
suppressed it, simply lettinq R indicate the probability of a reported
hourly wage. (Extension of this reasoning demonstrates also that if
and E2areuncorrelated, then consistent estimates of P1 and P2 and
the parameters of the market wage function are obtained by the procedure
used in Section II. We shall return to this.)
The possible outcomes--corresponding to the diagram--are as follows:
(i) Pr[Not employed]
=Pr[E<0]
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1. As in the single equation model we consider the minimum to be an
interval, going from to M2.-37-







































( - R) =Pr(5).(l-R)
We see from (i) that the probability that an individual is notemployed
is given by the probability of not being employed without theminimum,
Pr[E <0];plus the probability that without the minimum he would be
employed at a wage below M, times the probability that he is not employed




pertain to the remaining expressions.-38-
The log-likelihood function for N observations is then given by
N1 N2 N5











where i indexes individuals and N1 +
N2
+... + N5=N.Thus as long
as R does not depend on parameters that enter elsewhere in the likelihood
function, it may be disregarded in estimation. Equation (8) is maximized
with respect to c, ,a,P1. P2, and p.
Now suppose triat, given X, E and W are uncorrelated so that p =0.Equa-







(ii) Pr[Employed with a wage w less than M]
=[Xc].f(w)P1R





(iv) Pr[Employed with a wage w greater than M]
=c[Xc].f(w).R
Cv)Pr[Employed without a wage]
= [XcL][(M-XB)/a](P1 + P2)(l - R)
-[(M-X)/c]}(i—R)-.39-
The probability of having an observed wage is equal to 1 -(i)-(v),
which is given by







where 0 is as defined in equation (2). The distribution of observed wage
rates, conditional on observing a wage, can be derived by dividing equations
(9,ii), (9,iii), and (9,iv), by (10). This gives the same result as equation (2)
in Section II describing h(w), since the expression R.[Xa] multiplies
each term in the numerator and denominator of each of the three parts of
the conditional density function (and cancels out). Thus, given our
assumptions, consistent estimates can be obtained from the single equation
model if p =0.
There is no analagous employment equation that does not depend on the
wage function, however. Thus even though p =0,estimation of the two
equations jointly provides information that cannot be duplicated by
estimating each separately.-40-
B. Estimates Based on the Two—Equation Model
Parameter estimates for the two-equation model based on all out-of-
school young men 16 to 24 and for those 20 to 24 are presented in Table 3.
They may be compared with the single equation estimates in the first and
fourth columns of Table 2. The sample used in the single equation estima-
tion can be thought of as contained in but comprising only part of the data
used in the two-equation estimation. The sample of all men in the 16 to
24 age group, within which the 3005 with an hourly wage rate were included,
is distributed by employment category as follows:
Category Percent Number
Total 100.0 5997
Not Employed 15.4 926
Employed 84.6 100.0 5071
Wage Rate Known 59.3 3005
Wage Rate Unknown 40.7 2066
For those 20 to 24 only, the distribution is:
Percent Number
Total 100.0 4278
Not Employed 12.7 542
Employed 87.3 100.0 3736
Wage Rate Known 57.0 2131
Wage Rate Unknown 43.0 1605
The estimates of p in Table 3 for both the 16 to 24 and the 20 to
24 age groups are essentially zero. This in itself would suggest, under
our assumptions, that the single-equation estimates should be approximately-41-
Table 3. Two-Equation Estimates for Men 16 to 24 and 20 to 24
Variable





Age 0.063 0.012 0.045 0.006
(15.905) (0.718) (7.261) (0.233)
School 0.033 0.078 0.029 0.068
(4.911) (6.958) (4.272) (4.748)
Black -0.104 -0.605 -0.104 -0.526
(1.691) (9.113) (1.673) (5.979)
Never Married -0.185 -0.468 -0.197 -0.476
(5.509) (7.093) (5.038) (5.990)
City -0.026 -0.206 -0.036 -0.209
(1.245) (3.701) (1.461) (2.774)
Area Wage 0.082 -0.065 0.081 -0.088
(8.799) (2.173) (6.639) (2.195)
Area Unemployment 0.009 -0.107 0.012 -0.121
(0.875) (5.902) (1.042) (4.942)
Constant -0.747 1.598 -0.322 2.150











of the correct order of magnitude, although thesimulated results using
both salary and hourly workers may differ from thosebased on hourly wage
workers only. The two-equation estimates for P1and P2 don't differ great-
ly from the single-equation counterparts--.27 versus.23 and .53 versus
.45 respectively for the 16 to 24 age groups and.27 versus .23 and .46
versus .45 for those 20 to 24. Recall thatthe single equation estimates
are based only on hourly wage workers.The two-equation model incorporates
both hourly and salaried workers--for whom we do nothave a wage rate--
and we assume that the same wage function and P1 and P2values apply to
both groups. The impact of the minimum on salariedworkers may well differ
from the effect on wage workers; the information wehave on the salaried
group is apparently too weak to verifythis.1
1. Because there is a large potential errorin hourly wage rates
estimated by using reported salaries and normal
hours worked, much of the
precision of actual wage rates is lost.The wage distributions for salar-
ied workers that we generated using the ratioof salaries to hours, how-
ever, suggest that salaried workerswith market wages below the minimum
may be more likely than comparablehourly workers to be employed belowthe
minimum, and less likely to be employed at theminimum.-43-
IV. Simulations
We shall present first simulations based on thesingle-equation
model and then additional ones based on the two-equationspecification.
The single—equation version is somewhat easier to work withand, because
the relevant parameter estimates do not differgreatly from one to the
other, we have presented some details that could be obtained basedon the
two-equation estimates but were not. Although the estimated employment im-
pact of the minimum varies somewhat depending on the model, the general
implications do not. Some results, however, are impossible to infer from
the single-equation estimates only. Such results arepresented in the
second part of this section. In particular, we are able to infer the
distribution of non-employment by marketwage rate, with and without the
minimum.
A. Simulations Based on the Single-Equation Model
From the estimates in Table 1 we may by simulation obtain estimates
of the effects of the minimum wage on the employment andwage rates of
these youth. These estimates are summarized in the tabulation below.The
simulations use all observations used in estimation and allow forweighting
of these observations depending on the likelihood that an individual with
attributes X who would have been employed with the minimum is not observed
with a wage because of the minimum. The numbers thus pertain tohourly
ge workers only. All of the estimates pertain to 1978 as well. Thus
the implication of lowering the minimum, for example, from $2.65 to $2.30
should be thought of in terms of 1978 dollars. The simulationmethodology
is explained in detail in Appendix A.-44-
Blacks& WhitesBlacksWhitesBlacks&Whites
16-24 l6-.4 16-24 20-2416-17
1.Percent increase 6.8 11.9 5.5 3.6 9,5
in employment
if no minimum




3. Employment jci -.222 -.309 -.193 -.171 -.178.
re increase of minimum
from 2.65 to 3.10
4. Expected wage, given 4.14 3.80 4.18 4.54 2.75
the minimum, of those
empi oyed
5. Expected wage, given the 3.78 3.29 3.88 4.32 2.53
minimum of all those
who would have been
employed without the
minimum
6. Expected 3.87 3.43 3.95 4.39 2.49




If there were no minimum wage, according to row 1, the number of
male youth between 16 and 24 with jobs would be 6.8 percent higher than
it is (1978) now.It would be only 3.6 percent higher for those 20 to
24 and 9.5 percent higher among those 16 to 17.
Around the level of the minimum wage, the estimates of employment
elasticities with respect to changes in the minimum are approximately
20 percent, but are considerably lower for the older group. Our
methodology allows the elasticity to vary depending upon the level of
the minimum relative to the underlying distribution of wage rates. Thus-45-
while standard estimates require that a single estimated elasticity
be used to extrapolate employment effects for all levels of the minimum,
our procedure allows the employment effect of an incremental change in
the minimum to depend on its level. The closer the minimum is to the
central tendency of the wage distribution, the greater the elasticity.
A comparison of the elasticities for 20 to 24 and 16 to 17 year olds
reveals this property. The minimum wage is much lower than the central
tendency of the wage distribution of the older youth but above the
central tendency of the wage rates of the younger group.
Our estimates suggest that reductiorin the minimum would have
relatively large effects down to about $2.00; but are close to zero
below $1.50. For the group as a whole, the estimated marginal effects
on employment of successive reducttons in the mtnimum are as follows:
- PercentIncrease
Reduction in Employment
$2.65 to 2.30 2.6
2.30 to 2.00 1.8
2.00 to 1.70 1.2
1.70 to 1.50 0.5
At a minimum of $1.50, our simulations indicatethat the expected
wage of youth ($4.07) is approximately equal to the estimatedexpected
market wage of $4.05. As shown above, at about $1.50further reduction
in the minimum would have virtuallyno effect on employment.-46-
The fourth row of the tabulation on page 44 shows the expected wage
of those employed, given the existinq minimum. By comparison of the fifth
and sixth rows, it can be seen that because some youth who would be employ-
ed in the absence of the minimum are not employed, the expected wage of the
total group that would have been employed without the minimum is lower with
it than without it. The expected market wage of the total group is shown
in row 6. The increase of wages of some youth from below the minimum up
to the minimum is more than offset by non-employment (zero wages) of others.
The average difference is 9 cents per hour.1
The expected market wage of $2.49 for the 16 to 17 age group is well
below the minimum wage of $2.65. To the extent that this figure is accept-
ed, it is not surprising that the estimated employment effect is relative-
ly large for this group.
According to our model, the wage effects are concentrated on
persons who would otherwise be paid below the minimum. Thus for these
sub-minimum workers, the loss in expected wages is greater than indicated
by the numbers above. For all youth with sub-minimum market wages,
the expected wage is 10 percent lower with than without the minimum
($2.06 versus $1.83). The loss is 9.1 percent for whites ($2.08 versus
$1.89) and 13.1 percent for blacks ($1.98 versus $1.72). It is 14.3 percent
for teenagers 16 and 17 ($2.17 versus $1.86). Only for older youth 20
1. The estimates in rows 4, 5, and 6 were obtained by estimating
logarithm values first and then converting these to absolute values. Thus
there may be some error because of the non-linearities involved, but we
believe that the relative magnitudes are not affected substantially.-47-
to 24 is there essentially no effect of the minimumwage on the expected
wage of sub-minimum wage workers (an estimated gain of 2.4 percent).
Finally, we have applied the parameter estimates basedon hourly wage
workers to all those employed, bothhourly and salaried. This allows us to
estimate the total number of out-of-schoolyoung men that would be employ-
ed if the minimum were eliminated. For the totalgroup, we can also compare
observed employment ratios with simulated ratioswithout the minimum.
These values are given, by selected subgroups, inthe tabulation below.
It is often argued that the minimumwage has a greater effect on black
than on white youth employment,presumably because of the lower levels of
education and other wage related attributesamong black youth. Our results
are consistent with this claim. That is, according to theseestimates,
if the minimum were eliminated, employmentamong black youth would be in-
creased by 12 percent, while employment of whiteyouth would be increased
by only 5 percent. Nonetheless, only 30 percent of thedifference between
the employment ratios of black and whiteyouth is due to the minimum, accord-
ing to our estimates.
Blacks & WhitesBlacksWhitesBlacks & Whites
16—24 16-24 16—24 20-24 16-17
1. Observed employment 84.6 66.6 87.1 87.3 70.2
ratio with the
minimum.
2. Percent increase 6.6 12.2 5.3 3.5 9.5
in employment if no
minimum.
3. Employment ration with- 90.1 77.4 91.7 90.4 76.8
out the minimum.-48-
B. Simulations based on the Two-Equation Model
Simulations based on the two-equation model for young men 16 to 24 are
shown in the tabulation below. The tabulation shows the simulated distributions
Simulated Employment and Wages, Men 16 to 24
Wage Rate Wage Rate
Below Minimum Above Minimum








of the 5997 persons in our sample, with and without the minimum. Of
persons with market wage rates below the minimum, who without the minimum
are employed, 20 percent (180) are without work with the minimum. Accord-
ing to these simulations, elimination of the minimum would increase total
employment among young men by 3.6 percent. (The percent employed would
increase from 84.6 percent to 87.5 percent.) The single-equation model
based on 3005 hourly wage employees only implied that their number would
be increased by 6.8 percent, if the minimum were eliminated. The single-














hourly and salaried workers) predicts an increase of 6.6 percent, as com-
pared with 3.6 percent based on the two-equation model. It is to be ex-
pected that because a smaller proportion of salaried than hourly workers
have market wages below the minimum, the percentage effect on both groups
would be smaller than on hourly workers only. The difference between the
two-equation and single—equation results, however, is apparently due only
in small part to this fact.
There are other characteristics of the simulations that we find strik-
ing. Without a minimum, among youth with market wages below the minimum,
16 percent would not be employed, while of those with market wage rates a-
bove the minimum, 12 percent would not be employed. With the minimum, 32
percent of the sub-minimum wage group are not employed. Thus the results
suggest that low wage workers would be disproportionately without work in
either case, but the minimum wage magnifies substantially the difference
between the employment rates of the two groups. Without a minimum, only
23 percent of non-employment is accounted for by those with sub-minimum
market wages, while with the minimum this group accounts for 38 percent of
non-employment.
It is of course impossible to infer these results without jointly
estimating the wage and employment equations together. We need both
market employment and market wage estimates, neither of which can be esti-
mated without taking account of the effect of the minimum itself on each
of them.-50-
Analagous simulations for the age group 20 to24 are presented below.
Simulated Employment and Wages, Men 20 to 24
Market Wage Rate Market Wage Rate
Below Minimum Above Minimum














Employment among this age group, if the minimum wereeliminated, would be
3.7 percent higher that it is--91.0 percent instead of 87.3 percent--
3ccording to these estimates. (For this age group,virtually the same
estimate is obtained by applying the single-equation parameterestimates
to all employed young men, both hourly and salaried.)And again, we ob-
serve that the minimum tends to increase theconcentration of non-employ-
ment among low-wage youth. Without the minimum, the estimated12.4 percent
of those with below-minimum market wages who are not employedaccount for
only 15.4 percent of non-employment, while with theminimum the 40.3 per-
cent of the sub-minimum group who are not employed accountfor 37.1 per-
cent of those withoutwork.
499 3778
499 3778—51—
V. Discussion and Conclusions
Our results imply that if there were no minimum wage, the number of
out-of-school young men who are employed would be 4 to 6 percent higher
than it is now. Among hourly workers, the effect is apparently the
largest. Possibly one-half of the potential increase in employment could
be gained by a 15 percent decrease in the minimum. Although the potential
percentage increase in employment is greater for younger than for older
youth, more older youth are employed. In 1978, for example, there were
601,000 employed males 16 and 17 who were not in school, and 6,735,000
male students 20 to 24. Thus a 9.5 percent increase for those 16 to 17
(from our single-equation results) would be 57,000, whereas a 3.6 percent
increase for 20 to 24 year olds would be 242,000. These data apply to
out-of-school youth, however, and most youth 16 to 17 are in school.
Our estimates imply also that the likelihood that a male non-student
youth 16 or 17 with a market wage below the minimum is employed at or
below the minimum is greater than the likelihood for older workers--.85
versus .69. Thus for example, whether a youth minimum is desirable, as
opposed say to a reduction in the minimum, depends on the goals of the
reduction. The effect on individuals of different ages may not be the
same as the aggregate effects by age group.
The average wage paid to youth according to our estimates is lower
with the minimum than it would be without it. Although those youth who
are employed earn more on average than they would without the minimum,
the increase for these youth is more than offset by the non-employment
of others. Thus those least well-off without the minimum bear a—52—
disproportionate share of the cost of the minimum wage legislation.
Because increases in wage rates come to a large extentwith work
experience, reduced work experience when youngresults in substantially
reduced wage rates when older. Thus the total effectof the minimum
on these low-market-wage workers is likelyto be greater than the effect
implied by the point-in-time estimates reportedin the paper.
There are, of course, several possible effects of theminimum wage
that our analysis does not address. We have set forth amodel that we
believe captures the primary postulated effects of theminimum wage as
they are described by most researchers. In particular,we have assumed
that the effect would be concentrated on persons whowould otherwise
receive wages below the minimum. Although economic theory suggeststhat
substitution of higher quality for lower quality workers,for example,
may raise the wage rates ofworkers with market wages above the minimum,
the first order effect is thought to be on low wage persons.It may also
be that increases in the minimum wage have an inflationaryeffect on the
wage rates paid to all workersand thus shift upward the underlying dis-
tribution of wage rates. Such effects could beestimated if both time
series and cross-section data were used and we willdo that in future
research.
It can be demonstrated that a purely inflationaryshift in the
underlying distribution would affect ourestimated elasticities with
respect to a change in the minimum,but not our estimated total employ-
ment effects, were the minimum to be eliminated. (Thisis explained in
more detail in Appendix A.)may also affect school attendance rates. Thus far
formal analysis to out-of-school youth. A possible
would incorporate a school attendance equation or
is to obtain separate estimated effects for youth
It may also be that the minimum wage affects hours worked, even
among employed youth. For example, youth may be more likely to work part-
time with a minimum than without it. Explicit allowance for this possi-
bility, as well as effects on school attendance, we believe would tend if
anything to increase the employment effect of the minimum if employment
were 'adjusted" to account for these possibleeffects.2
—53-
The minimum wage
we have restricted our
extension of our model
would use the model as
in school.
1. Most part-time workers are students and are therefore excluded
in large part from our analysis.
2. Sherwin Rosen in his discussion has also pointed out that our data
excludes military personnel and the minimum wage may interact with enlist-
ments, possibly for young men just out of high school in particular.-54-
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APVENDIX A: SIMULATIONS
Single Equation Model: Recall that D is the probability that a
person with attributes X. who would be employed without the minimum will
be employed when it is in effect. Thus for each person in our sample
with an observed wage rate and attributes X1, the expected number of
persons with attributes X who would be employed without the minimum is
simply l/D.. Given a sample of size N of employed persons, the number T





For any particular minimum j indicated by M. the predicted number





The change in employment resulting from a shift in the minimum from the
current 0to some M is then L0- L. Then:
(1) The percent increase in employment that would result if the
minimum were eliminated is (T -N)/N.
(2) The employment elasticity with respect to a reduction in the
minimum from 2.65 to 2.30 is [(L265 -L230)/N]/[(2.65 -2.30)/2.65].A- 2
(3) The employment elasticity with respectto an increase in the
minimum from 2.65 to 3.10 is[(L265 -L310)/N]/[(2.65 - 3.10)12.65]..
(4) Given the minimum, the expected wageof those pjoyed is given
by
1 N Pr(W. >M)





This is simply the expected value of thedensity in equation (3), averaged
over persons in the sample.
(5) Given the minimum, the expected wageof those who would have






where the term in brackets is the same as under(4) above.
(6) The expected market wage ofall persons who would have been





Two-Equation Model :Let N now represent the total number of persons in
the sample--employed and not employed, with and without an observed wage






Thenumber not employed is given by
N-T.






Thenumber with wage rates above M is given by
N=N-N.
The other entries in the top part of the tabulations on pages 47 and 49
may be calculated using the estimated parameters in the bivariate normal
function of our model. For example, the number not employed and with











The other three entries are obtained analagously.A-4
With the minimum,thenumber L of jobslostis given by













The number pj.Qy4. is
T-L
The number not employed is
N -(T
-L)
The number not ernplqyed and with wage ratesless than M is given by
N









The other elements in the bottom part ofthe tabulations on pages 47 and 49
are the same as in the top part.
An alternative method of simulating the job loss resulting from the
minimum is based on a method analagous to the one used in the single equation
simulations. It is based only on employed persons. (In practice this alter-
native method and the one described above give almost identical results.)
Analagous to D, we define a D(2) which in the conditional probabilityA- 5
that a person who would be employed without the minimum will still be
employed when it is in effect. It is the conditional probability o.f
employment, given that E >0,and may be written as


















If N is the total number employed with the minimum in effect, then the


















Inparticular, the number of jobs lost at the existing minimumM0 is L0 rd
employment N at the existing minimum is given by
N =T-
L0.
A Shift in the Wage Distribution: As mentioned in the text, it is
sometimes argued that the minimum wage has a purely inflationary effect on
all wages; that is, it shifts upward the wage rates paid to all workers.A-6
Within the context of our model, we could in this case think of the effect of
the minimum in two parts: first, it shifts all wages upward, and second,
persons remain employed or lose their jobs accordingto the mechanism
we have described, but with respect to this "shifted'distribution.
Using only cross-section data, we are unable to estimatethe magnitude
of such shifts if they do occur, but we could do sousing both
cross section and time series data. We will do thisin future research.
In the meantime, we note that such shifts would not affect ourestimates
of lost employment resulting from the minimum, although theywould affect
our employment elasticity estimates with respect to a changein the
minimum.
That is, with a purely inflationary increase in the underlying
distribution, the total employment loss is the increase in employmentthat
would result, given the shifted distribution, if the minimum wereeliminated.
To test the sensitivity of our elasticity estimates tosuch shifts--
with changes in the minimum—-we have calculated them assumingselected
shifts in the underlying wage distribution, using the single equation
model. As in the text we begin by assuming that without aminimum the
logarithm of the wage rate is given by
(A-14) ln W =X+e
But in this case, we assume in addition that with a minimum all wages
are shifted upward by an amount S(M) so thatwithout the discontinuities
caused by the minimum, wage rates would be given by
(A-15) w(M) =w.s(M)A- 7
and in W(M)by
(A-16) in W(M) =X++ in
S(M)
In this case, the shift associated with the minimum M is simply embodied in
our estimated constant term.
Relative to the underlying wage rates with the current minimum M, wage
rates with another minimum would be given by
S(M.)
(A—17) W(M) = _____
wit h
S(M.)
(A-18) in W(M) =X+c + in
S(M)
Our modei of course does not provide estimates of the last term, but the
sensitivity of our elasticity results can be checked by substituting for
X, in the lost employment calculations, X +K,where K is a selected
value for in [S(M)/S(M)]. For example, we could assume that a 15 percent
reduction in the minimum would shift the underlying distribution down by
5 percent so that S(M)/S(M) would be .95.
We can demonstrate now that a shift as described above would not affect
the estimate of jobs lost as a result of the minimum. To see this, we
have rewritten equation (A-2), to allow for the shift parameter, as
M — — ln(S(M.)/S(M)
(l—P,—P2)
(A—19) L. = a I
' i=lA-8
The denominator depends only on the current minimum. At the current
minimum, M =Mand the shift term is equal to zero. Thus our estimate
of the non-employment effect of the present minimum is not affected by
possible shifting of the underlying wage distribution. However, simulated
employment elasticities based on a comparison of L with some Lk will
depend on the shift term. They will be somewhat lower, depending on the
magnitude of the shift.